

***IN SEARCH OF (NEW) IDENTITY:
HOPKINS AND NIETZSCHE***

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Introduction

The apparently striking connection between G. M. Hopkins, the English poet, and F. Nietzsche, the German philosopher, who most probably never heard of each other, has been generated by the-search-for-identity theme which both share. The former, a devotional poet, constantly oscillating between doubt and belief, was wondering in a real Parmenidesian tradition "What must it be to be someone else?"

I find myself both as a man and as myself something most determined and distinctive, at pitch, more distinctive and higher pitched than anything else I see, ...

...when I consider my self being, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of *I* and *me* above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale and alum, more distinctive than the smell, of walnut leaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself: 'What must it be to be someone else?'). Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness and selving, this self being of my own.¹

The latter, a nihilist philosopher, questioned the ability of consciousness to know the world and considered the growth of consciousness to be a constant danger that could turn into a disease:

...the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface-and-sign world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious *becomes* by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities and generalisation. Ultimately, the growth of consciousness becomes a danger; and anyone who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows that it is a disease.²

The identity which Hopkins was in search of renders him unique among the English poets. Although he incessantly wondered what it was like to be someone else, his religious belief prevented him from losing his identity, so he remained himself, unique in his devotion and sensibility throughout his whole life. His inescapable self-hood provided a deep sensitivity which caused unhappiness and despair. His “terrible sonnets” written in the later period of his life witness the way in which Hopkins suffered periods of anguish and grief when his self-hood became almost unbearable. But either in praise (his earlier period) or in anguish (his later one), Hopkins was conscious of the power and energy of God in His creation of the varied world or in His wrestling with the stubborn soul. Hopkins’s poetry was written, principally, to the glory of God, and in praise and reverence of Him.

Nietzsche’s search for identity is more complex. Between praise and doubt he chose doubt, which first generated anguish and sadness, then certainty and happiness and eventually turned into belief-in-doubt:

The greatest recent event – that “God is dead,” that the belief in the Christian God had ceased to be believable – is even now beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe. ... In the main, however, this may be said: the event itself is much too great, too distant, too far from the comprehension of the many even for the tidings of it to be thought of as having *arrived* yet, not to speak of the notion that many people might know what has really happened here, and what must collapse

now that this belief has been undermined – all that was built upon it, leaned on it, grew into it; for example, our whole European morality....³

Contrary to common criticism, Nietzsche seems to lament God's death, to have mixed feelings about it, to constantly oscillate between unhappiness and relief. Unlike Hopkins, Nietzsche does not turn upon himself and his personal relationship to God, but refers to man in general and, from his newly acquired 'prophet' status, tries to preach and teach mankind of the benefits of the freedom of soul in a Godless world. Overcoming man's weaknesses and developing the will to master oneself become most important virtues that are ultimately to lead to the emergence of the 'overman' as the new man of the future, and of greatness as his major characteristic:

He shall be the greatest who shall be the loneliest, the most hidden, the most deviating, the human being beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, he that is overrich in will. Precisely this should be called *greatness*: to be capable of being as manifold as whole, as wide as full.⁴

Übermensch in the original, 'overman' should be understood not as a super-brute, as the direct translation of the word suggests, but a human being who has created for himself that unique position in the cosmos which the Bible considered his divine birthright. Unlike Hopkins who believes in life after death which ultimately gives meaning to this life, Nietzsche claims that the meaning of life is found on earth and that it lies in the evolution of the few human beings who rise themselves above the all-too-human mass.

Praise and doubt in Hopkins's poetry

According to his *Devotional Writings* and *Retreat Notes* and to his *Journal* and *Letters* as well, Hopkins's perception of God and the Trinity seems to be twofold: *directly*, through the poet's communication with God, which makes him oscillate between hope of redemption and doubt of ever reaching

holiness; and *indirectly*, through the surrounding animate and inanimate things created by God, which induce in him an immediate urge for praising. Hopkins seems to have struggled all his life and to never have found a way of reconciliation between these two perceptions of Divinity. Whenever he writes about God's creation, his tone is cheerful, his epithets lively, his colours light and his urgent need for glorification overt.

"Why does God create?" he wonders in *The Principle of Foundation*.⁵ God has "a purpose, an end, a meaning in his work. He meant the world to give him praise, reverence and service: to give him glory".⁶ But unlike the non-human world which glorifies God through its mere existence, unknowingly, unconsciously, man, His most important creation, should praise him "freely, willing to reverence him, gladly to serve him"⁷. And how else can man give God glory if not by praising his creation of inanimate and animate things of the non-human kind conceived to serve God and him alike?

Describing Providence as what God "planned for our use and patterned for our admiration" (*DW*, 279), Hopkins interestingly comments upon its *imperfection*: "the sun shines too long and withers the harvest, the rain is too heavy and rots it or in floods spreading washes it away; the air and water carry in their currents the poison of disease ... everything is full of *fault, flaw, imperfection, shortcoming*." (italics mine; *DW*, 279). Something made of this Providence "a shattered frame" and "a broken web".

One way to communicate with God, to feel, perceive, and understand Him is through the non-human world which mediates between us and Him and which reveals our real worldly dimension. But honouring God means refraining from sin, for how can one "wilfully dishonour Him and yet be meaning to honour Him? Choose to disobey and mean to serve Him?" (*DW*, 291).

Since man is the only one among God's creatures who has the power of choice, he is also mostly open to temptation and fall. The shifting movement between fall and redemption is set against an unfastened, precarious scale which man can seldom master. Hopkins's problem is how to work on this scale to be one with God in spirit, directly through meditation and holy life. It is at this level that doubt intervenes. It is here that Hopkins's

self seems to be divided into two: confidence in redemption and fear of failing God:

Once I turned from thee and hid,
 Bound on what thou hadst forbid;
 Sow the wind I would; I sinned:
 I repent of what I did.
 Bad I am. But yet thy child.
 Father be thou reconciled.
 Spare thou me, since I see
 With thy might that thou art mild.
 (*Thee God I come from*)

While in *Thee God I come from*, the poet's tone is brisk and hopeful (a rather unusual thing for Hopkins), in *Carrion Comfort*, for example, among other poems, one can hear the desperate cry of a doubting conscience.

Cheer whom though? The hero whose heaven-handling flung me, foot trod
 Me? or mé that fought him? O which one ? Is it each one? That night, that
 year
 Of now done darkness I wretch lay wrestling with (my God!) my God.
 (*Carrion Comfort*)

Doubt seems to have permeated the poet's conscience more than confidence has. In the 1889 *Retreat Notes*, Hopkins writes:

I was continuing this train of thought this evening when I began to enter on that course of loathing and hopelessness which I have so often felt before, which made me fear madness and led me to give up the practice of meditation except, as now, in retreat.⁸

Unhappy with his "wretched life", with the little he has done and the waste of time, Hopkins has bursts of self-pity when he says that "my helplessness and weakness is such that I could scarcely do otherwise". (*RN*, 302) And then he adds: "I am like a straining eunuch. I wish ... for death: yet if I died now I

should die imperfect, no master of myself, and that is the worst failure of all. O my God, look down on me". (*RN*, 302)

Hopkins is one of the poets whose feelings cannot be separated from his poetic creation. Everything that impressed or tormented him in his life found expression in his poems, which became both a vehicle for thought transmission and a means of God's appraisal. The twofold approach to God, evident in most of Hopkins's poems, is probably made most relevant in *Pied Beauty* and *No Worst*.

The exultant invocation that opens *Pied Beauty* ("Glory be to God for dappled things") is illustrative of Hopkins's belief in God's "plainly imperfect" creation as a perfect way of approaching and understanding Him. The lines of the poem remind the reader of Hopkins's *Journal* in which he also has minute landscape descriptions that mix the breathtaking beauty of land, sky and vegetation with "things counter, original, spare, strange." Hopkins's *Pied Beauty*, which he most probably wrote before his *Devotional Writings*, evinces the "shattered frame" and "broken web" of Providence as a sound proof of God's power of creation. Faulty and imperfect, things are born from, and in their turn give birth to, an odd combination of the four basic elements: air, water, fire and earth. The "skies of couple-colour as a brindled cow" (*air*) counterpoint "rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim" (*water*) and form a vivid and rather shocking image, a very strange combination of *water*, *air* and *fire*: "fresh fire-coal chestnut-falls; finches' wings". Line five ("Landscape plotted and pieced-fold, fallow and plough"), obviously focuses on the fourth element: *earth*. However, one cannot separate the animate from the inanimate side of the "dappled things": skies as a "brindled cow", "trout that swim", "finches' wings" are tied together, "yoked", because they are meant to reveal the same thing: the grandeur of their creator. Although nowhere in lines 5 and 6 the idea of man is directly expressed, his presence is felt in the metonyms: "plotted", "plough", "trade" and "gear". "Gear" seems to be a most interesting word as it may refer to God's creating the world as a mechanism, as an organism at both the macro- and micro-structural level and/or to mechanisms or apparatus created by man and linked with "all trades".

However, man does not appear in the text as one of God's creations who should be glorified; his presence is more or less felt through the way he is connected with, or tied to, the "dappled things". The idea that God's animate and inanimate creation glorify him through their mere existence (*Devotional Writings*), is eventually coupled with the idea that man is the only conscious perceiver of God and of His creation. He is the only one who can understand the "fathering-forth" of nature through "the blissful agony or stress of selving in God" (*DW*, 289). Line ten of the poem counterpoints the preceding ones by disclosing the image of perfection and eternity ("beauty...past change") as opposed to imperfection, perishable nature, whereas line eleven echoes line one in an extremely successful attempt to close the poem in a circle-like manner.

While in *Pied Beauty* the creator is perceived *indirectly* through man, a vehicle for praising God, and nature, seen as a mediator between man's self and God, in "No worst, there is none" a *direct* dramatic monologue is established between the poet's self and his creator. The former, the indirect perception of divinity resembles the perception of the world through stained glass; the latter, the direct one, may be compared to the perception of the world through simple window glass, through which you feel God's presence and/or see Him, but cannot reach or feel Him. The shift from indirectness to directness of perception turns Hopkins's poems into real confessions and secures the self a secluded position from which he can speak to God alone, revealing his doubts, indecision and despair, and leaving the reader aside, making him feel like an intruder.

Written partly as a meditation on sin and pain and partly as a dialogue between self and God, "No Worst" obviously has a less cheerful tone and a vocabulary which describes pain, grief, doubt and despair. However, the poem is well-balanced. It starts with the powerful image of Christ's Passions, "Pitched past pitch of grief", transmuted to the poet's present and, possibly, future personal tormenting experiences (line two). Doubt comes up in lines three and four, but the invocation differs from the one in *Pied Beauty*, for Hopkins does not refer to God the Father this time, but to Jesus (the Comforter) and Mary. A possible explanation may be found again in

Hopkins's *Devotional Writings*, where he considers Christ and the Blessed Virgin as "outstress(es) of God's power", as the first and second intention of "God outside Himself" (*DW*, 288). This particular perspective on Jesus and Mary confers the two a more human, "less than original" position. Thus, they would not only be able to understand grief, but also know how to comfort it.

A most unusual conclusion, seemingly unrelated to the rest of the lines, is drawn at the end of the poem: "all / Life death does end and each day dies with sleep". It comes both as a philosophical statement, reminding us of Shakespeare's lines in *Hamlet*, and as a Christian meditation on the meaning of *death*. If with Shakespeare "to die - to sleep" seem to be another facet of life, its other side, its counterpart, with Hopkins, death is definite, an end in itself, which needs careful preparation during man's life. So, unlike Shakespeare's, Hopkins's view on death is Christian rather than philosophical. In his gloomy meditations, he foresees death as brought forth by "pangs" and as a terrifying way of "ebbing life away" (*DW*, 296). Not even those who seem to die peacefully are excused from feeling or, at least, thinking of "that very last moment when flesh and spirit rent asunder and the soul goes out into the cold leaving the body its companion dear a corpse behind" (*DW*, 296). "Pangs" seem to be closely linked with the moment of dying, whether death is physical or spiritual. The word "pang" is often repeated in the *Journal* and applied both to body and to spirit:

But there are worse pangs of death than those of the body. There is the sweat of fear, there is the dread of what is to come after. (*JP*, 219)

It is the "dread of what is to come after" to a sinful conscience that permeates the fourteen lines of "No worst, there is none" and makes the poet oscillate between the fear of falling and the doubt of being worthy to receive comfort and relief.

The dread of failure coupled with the joy of sacrifice and the struggle for complete self-control over mind and body, with the doubts and torments of a diseased consciousness are counter-pointed, in Hopkins's poetry, by the

inscape/instress perception of the grandeur of God as Father and part of the Trinity, and of the world as His selved-in creation.

Doubt and self-overcoming with Nietzsche

In the opening of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche's most popular book, he introduces Zarathustra, a Moses-like figure, as the prophet who pronounces the death of God and the birth of the overman. The ultimate outcome of culture is the complete loss of faith in God and, consequently, in any manifestation of the supernatural

The relationship between the all-too-common people and the believer in the overman is shown in the parable of the tightrope walker of the Prologue. The walker, who represents man, loses his balance when he is halfway on the rope over the heads of the crowd because of the interference of a buffoon and falls to the ground. The man, the journey and the buffoon are symbolical. The walker stands for the creative man who understands the overall importance of self-overcoming and is halfway to becoming an overman. His journey is therefore the creative journey towards self-overcoming. The buffoon represents the 'last man' who fears the creative journey and the creative man in whom he sees only chaos and madness and, consequently, destroys him.

The doctrine of the earthly overman, as the final goal of a mankind freed of supernatural hopes, is therefore linked to the overcoming of one's own ego, a theme which Nietzsche develops throughout the whole book. Man has replaced God and has become his own creator. His longing for holiness is not the longing for the divinity, but the longing for the divine in himself:

Bitterness lies in the cup of even the best love: thus it arouses longing for the overman; thus it arouses our thirst, creator. Thirst for the creator, an arrow and longing for the overman.⁹

Nietzsche's doctrine is full of contradictions: he rejects the divinity, but not the divine represented, in his aesthetics by the concept of the Apollinian as opposed to the Dionysian. While the Apollinian "excites the eye" and "gains the power of vision",¹⁰ the Dionysian "discharges all its

means of expression at once and drives forth simultaneously the power of representation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and every kind of mimicking and acting”.¹¹ The Apollonian is the dream, a means of interpreting life through images, as Apollo represents the arts in which images are deliberately produced as an interpretation of existence. So Apollo is seen as representing the principle of individuation while the Apollonian tendency is the imposition of form and order upon the world. On the other hand, Dionysos represents the destruction of individuality and breaks the boundaries between individuals. Although Nietzsche describes the Dionysiac state as “physical intoxication”, he does not refer to the negative effects of drunkenness, but to a sort of “Dionysiac rapture”, a state in which the individual forgets himself completely and experiences mystical unity with the universe. Thus, the Dionysian is the earthly spirit (nature, reality, the universe), the Apollonian is the creative spirit, the divine. They form a binary opposition in which they constantly undermine and support each other. The Apollonian tendency is artistic and can therefore be found with painters, sculptors and poets. Yet looking for images to express the oneness of the universe, they are driven by the Dionysian tendency. From this point of view, Hopkins’s poetry is a wonderful example of the Apollonian and the Dionysian at work.

Though the two start from different principles, they actually reach the same conclusion as far as beauty in art is concerned. Beauty is not to be found in mere imitation of nature, but in the imposition of the Apollonian upon the Dionysian urge. With both writers, true beauty is obtained through the blending of pain and joy as in every overwhelming joy there is an undertone of terror. But while true beauty with Hopkins is God and his creation, however simplistic or unattractive it may seem, with Nietzsche, beauty is a sort of redemption through illusion in which an individual comes to know himself. The purpose of art, with Nietzsche, is the continual destruction of the Dionysian force when form, rhythm and harmony impose themselves on formlessness and chaos; with Hopkins, it is the revelation of ‘inscape’ and ‘instress’ in ordinary things and the struggle against the soul’s mortal sins.

The question of death is dealt with in Zarathustra's teaching of 'free death'. Unlike Hopkins, who believed in life after death and, like a true Christian, feared God's rage at his sins, Nietzsche introduced the doctrine "Die at the right time!" In other words the overman should decide when to die according to one's will. The prophet distinguishes between the 'all-too-many' who live 'all-too-long' and die too late and the few who die too early and cannot enjoy living and laughter. The example he gives for the latter category is 'the Hebrew Jesus' who "knew only tears and the melancholy of the Hebrew, and hatred of the good and the just" (*Zarathustra*, 185). Interestingly, Nietzsche reverses the hierarchy of values and interprets Jesus's love for the people as "hatred" because He did not preach the joy for living and laughter, but a canonical life, full of suffering in the hope of an ever happy life after death. So Jesus died too early and did not have the time to learn "to live and to love the earth – and laughter too" (*Zarathustra*, 185):

Believe me, my brothers! He died too early; he himself would have recanted his teaching, had he reached my age. Noble enough was he to recant. But he was not yet mature. Immature is the love of the youth, and immature his hatred of man and earth. His mind and the wings of his spirit are still tied down and heavy. (*Zarathustra*, 185)

The overman will know better when to die and when to live and, free in his death, he will probably be able to say "a holy No when the time for Yes has passed" (*Zarathustra*, 185). He will have developed, by then, a "will to power", as Nietzsche describes it in "On Self-Overcoming" (*Zarathustra*, 225-228). In their search for new values, "wise men" think they are following a "will to truth"; but what they are actually after is the desire to bring the whole existence under a code of understanding or some form of obedience and this is rather the manifestation of a "will to power":

Where I found the living, there I found will to power; and even in the will of those who serve I found the will to be master.

That the weaker should serve the stronger, to that it is persuaded by its own will, which would be the master over what is weaker still: this is the one pleasure it does not want to renounce. [...]

And life itself confided this secret to me: “Behold,” it said, “I am *that which must always overcome itself*. (Zarathustra, 226, 227)

The quotation above may look Darwinian, but it replaces the survival principle that Darwin preached with the will-to-power principle which is self-imposed and therefore requires more strength.

To escape subjection, living things must become capable of commanding themselves. But one cannot master oneself without obeying oneself. Self-command and self-obedience, which free an individual from the command of others, cannot be practised without the will to power, the key to self-overcoming. This one, in its turn, opens the gates to creativity, both constructive and destructive, as the overt manifestation of power:

And whoever must be the creator in good and evil, verily, he must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness: but this is creative. (Zarathustra, 228)

If will to self-overcoming is paramount in life, how important is then the soul?

Nietzsche opposes Christianity again by saying that the soul should be ruled by the mind which should impose on it, through its will to power, and dictate to it what it should do:

O my soul, I gave you the right to say No like the storm, and to say Yes as the clear sky says Yes: now you are still as light whether you stand or walk through storms of negation.

O my soul, I gave you back the freedom over the created and increated; and who knows, as you know, the voluptuous delight of what is yet to come? [...]

O my soul, I taught you to persuade so well that you persuade the very ground – like the sun who persuades even the sea to his own height.

O my soul, I took from you all obeying, knee-bending, and “Lord”-saying; I myself gave you the name “cessation of need” and “destiny”. (*Zarathustra*, 334)

Though Zarathustra sacrificed everything for his soul (“I gave you all, and I have emptied all my hands to you”, *Zarathustra*, 335), he is, paradoxically, quite doubtful whether his soul will be thankful for what it has received. The fright he feels at the thought that his soul may still not be very content seems to have the upperhand in the dialogue between the self and the soul:

O my soul, now I have given you all, and even the last I had, and I have emptied all my hands to you: *that I bade you sing*, behold, that was the last I had. That I bade you sing – speak now, speak: which of us has to be thankful now? Better yet, however: sing to me, sing. O my soul! And let me be thankful. (*Zarathustra*, 336)

As strange as it may seem, Nietzsche’s pronouncement “God is dead” is a mournful rather than a happy cry. The danger, as Nietzsche sees it, lies in the way in which the people understand to fill in the abyss that God leaves open with His leaving. Nietzsche does not favour, or preach the evil; on the contrary. Through Zarathustra, he is very worried about what or who the people will replace God with and about the way in which they will understand to use their newly acquired freedom. Freedom is great responsibility, says Nietzsche, and may easily turn against those who do not really know what to do with it. By proposing the ‘overman’ to take the vacant place left by God, Nietzsche envisages a spiritually superior kind of man, an earthly “lord” who has little in common with the socially superior “higher men” (*Zarathustra*, 398-408). Zarathustra’s only and main concern is not the preservation of man, but man’s self-overcoming which will lead him to power, creativity and courage. Bravery is a quality that only the one who knows fear and conquers it can obtain, the one “who sees the abyss, but with *pride*”, who “sees the abyss but with the eyes of an eagle” or the one “who grasps the abyss with the talons of an eagle.” (*Zarathustra*, 400).

Roughly speaking, Nietzsche develops a philosophical-humanistic system which, he hopes, may replace the well-established Christian system. This idea emerges both from doubt and from the deep sadness he feels at the realisation of God's absence. It is despair rather than relief that makes him wrestle with Christianity and enthrone the 'overman' as God's replacement. He is worried that if no prophet turned up in time and no new philosophy emerged, the human race might decay and perish and thus be unable to surpass the crisis. Nietzsche himself realises that he has dealt harshly with Christianity, but he feels that the disease of "bad conscience" requires harsh measures as a cure.¹² He is also aware that Christianity as a system is a "*whole* view of things thought out together"¹³ and that by "breaking one main concept out of it, the faith in God, one breaks the whole".¹⁴ Moreover,

Christian morality is a command; its origin is transcendent; it is beyond all criticism; it has truth if God is the truth – it stands and falls with faith in God.¹⁵

With Nietzsche, the mere way out of this crisis is a reversal of the association of guilt with natural instincts and the attaching of guilt to the nihilistic desire for otherworldliness. The strength needed for such an upheaval of values is very great and only a true redeemer like Zarathustra may turn moral condemnation against those who teach man to turn away from himself because he is a creature of eternal guilt.

Nietzsche does not negate the value of life; but, unlike Hopkins who praises heavenly life through God's world, he endeavours to reaffirm the values of earthly life, the life of the here and now. Although he questions morality as God's inheritance, he never opposes morality or the power of love. He only says that in order to appreciate 'love', one must know 'hatred' as one must know 'lie' before one can value 'truth'.

Conclusion

Nietzsche's philosophy did not appear out of the blue. The whole nineteenth century is featured by doubt and unbelief. In England, a number of thinkers (Thomas Carlyle, Francis Newman, J. S. Mill, Aldous Huxley) questioned

the Bible and worshipped the Muse of History as a goddess instead. Truth, they said, was revealed in History, rather than in the Bible. Moreover, truth was no longer seen as absolute, philosophically static, revealed once and for all, but as relative, genetic and evolutionary. Jesus's birth was no longer *the* event in history, but *an* event like many others on the earth. Through his studies, Darwin cast much doubt on whether life had ever been created. Francis Newman found much of the Christian dogma immoral and the doctrines of Atonement, Predestination, Redemption by grace and Eternal Punishment as horrifying and wicked. But none of them had the genius to try to replace the Christian Cosmology with a sustainable system. However contradictory or confusing Nietzsche's system may be, it is only a concrete effect of an almost century-long turmoil of thought.

Hopkins, on the other hand, represents the group of believers, of those who could not give up faith as, they argued, faith comes from the heart and from the will to believe, not from the intellect or reason. Although Hopkins is the most fervent representative of one group and Nietzsche is, perhaps, the most controversial representative of the other, they both experience the pains of evil and insecurity before they feel hope and witness revelation.

Note:

¹ G.M.Hopkins. *The Sermons and Devotional Writings of G.M.Hopkins*, Christopher Devlin (ed.), S.J., London, 1959, pp. 122-123, hereafter cited as *DW*, followed by page number.

² Friedrich Nietzsche. "From *The Gay Science*" in *The Portable Nietzsche*, Walter Kaufmann, (ed.), The Viking Press, New York, 1972, p. 445.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 446.

⁵ G.M.Hopkins. "The Principle of Foundation" in *The Oxford Authors: Gerard Manley Hopkins*, Frank Kermode (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1986, p. 290.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁸ G.M.Hopkins, "Retreat Notes" in Frank Kermode (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 302, hereafter cited as *RN*, followed by page number.

⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra", in *The Portable Nietzsche, op.cit.*, p. 183, hereafter cited as *Zarathustra*, followed by page number.

¹⁰ See Friedrich Nietzsche, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” from *Twilight of Idols*, in *The Existential Mind: Documents and Fictions*, Frederick R. Karl and Leo Hamalian (eds.), Fawcett Premier Books, Fawcett, Connecticut, 1974, p. 65.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² See the reading that Stanley McDaniel does to “The Genealogy of Morals” (Second Essay, 24) in *The Major Works of Nietzsche*, Monarch Press, New York, 1965, p. 133.

¹³ Friedrich Nietzsche, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” in F. Karl and L. Hamalian (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 61.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*